The Battle of Yarmuk : Khalid bin walid Einstein of war Stratergy




The Battle of Yarmuk, fought in 636 AD, was the turning point in Arab history that put a stop to any future Muslim attempt to expand into Europe. Fought between Arab general Khalid ibn al Walid and the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius, it showed that Byzantine arms would not be tarnished by the newfound tactics of the Arabs.After the battle, the Arabs were eager to avoid battle with the Byzantines and instead shifted their efforts eastward into central and southern Asia.The Byzantines,on the other hand, learned from Arab Light Cavalry tactics, and utilized them in their later conquest of Central Europe and Russia.

Date15–20 August 636
LocationNear the Yarmouk River
32.81411°N 35.95482°ECoordinates32.81411°N 35.95482°E
ResultDecisive Rashidun victory
Territorial
changes
Levant annexed by Rashidun Caliphate
Belligerents
 Byzantine Empire,
Ghassnid Kingdom
 Rashidun Caliphate
Commanders and leaders
 Heraclius
 Theodore Trithyrius 
 Vahan 
Jabalah ibn al-Aiham
 Dairjan 
 Niketas the Persian
 Buccinator (Qanateer)
 Gregory
 ʿUmar ibn al-Khattāb
 Khalid ibn al-Walid
 Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah
 Amr ibn al-A'as
 Khawla bint Al-Azwar
 Shurahbil ibn Hassana
 Yazid ibn Abi Sufyan
 Al-Qa'qa'a ibn Amr at-Tamimi
 Ayadh bin Ghanim
Dhiraar bin Al-Azwar
Abdul-Rahman ibn Abi Bakr.
Strength
15,000-150,000
(modern estimates)
100,000–400,000
(primary sources)
15,000–40,000
(modern estimates)
24,000–40,000
(primary sources)
Casualties and losses
45% or 50,000+ killed
(modern estimates)
70,000–120,000 killed
(primary sources)
3,000 killed

Abu bakr : the mathematical calculation of future Warfares. 


Caliph Abu Bakr devised a plan of action to expand the tiny Rashidun Caliphate beyond his peoples wildest dreams. A profound mathematician, Abu Bakr had worked out the exact timings involved to knock out his two most immediate enemies in one go. Both Persia and Byzantium were large but essentially weak nations, with a hatred inherited from years of rivalry and warfare. There was no one else of any importance in the area (save the Khazars, who had admittedly slipped through Abu Bakr's calculations) and consequently he felt it would be easiest first to eliminate the Byzantines, the stronger of Arabia's future opponents, and then to use what was left of this force to conquer Persia. Having shared his plans with Khalid ibn al Walid, his strongest commander, he was ready to initiate his invasion plans by the opening months of 636AD.




Heraclius: the last thing we expectied was invasion from Arabia 

The Byzantines, who had been watching their border with Persia at the time, were taken completely by surprise; the last thing they were expecting was invasion from Arabia. However, Emperor Heraclius managed to scrape together an army strong enough to oppose the Arab invasion.His army outnumbered the Arabs, and included heavily armored infantry and cavalry, which would later cut the Arabs' lightly armored, ill-trained soldiers to pieces.

The East Roman army had the two basic divisions of cavalry and infantry. The infantry fell into two main categories, the skutatoi and psiloi. The skutatoi were the front line infantry. These troops were armed with spear, long or short sword, and axe. Defensively they carried a circular or oval shield, wore chainmail or padded leather shirts, and a segmented helm, often with a crest, to identify their unit. The psiloi were the missile troops, armed with javelin and most importantly composite shortbow, their armor being the same or slightly less than the skutatoi. On the attack the psiloi could weaken the enemy with a barrage of arrows, followed by a charge of spearmen and swordsmen to break the enemy formation. Defensively the skutatoi could form a shield wall, interlocking their shields and presenting their spears en masse, with the psiloi stationed to the rear and still capable of launching volleys into the enemy ranks.


Muslim's Stratergy 

The Muslims discovered Heraclius' preparations at Shaizar through Roman prisoners. Alert to the possibility of being caught with separated forces that could be destroyed, Khalid called for a council of war. There he advised Abu Ubaidah to pull the troops back from Palestine and from Northern and Central Syria, and then to concentrate the entire Rashidun army in one place. Abu Ubaidah ordered the concentration of troops in the vast plain near Jabiya, as control of the area made cavalry charges possible and facilitated the arrival of reinforcements from Umar so that a strong, united force could be fielded against the Byzantine armies. The position also benefited from close proximity to the Rashidun stronghold of Najd, in case of retreat. Instructions were also issued to return the jizya (tribute) to the people who had paid it. However, once concentrated at Jabiya, the Muslims were subject to raids from pro-Byzantine Ghassanid forces. Encamping in the region was also precarious as a strong Byzantine force was garrisoned in Caeseara and could attack the Muslim rear while they were held in front by the Byzantine army. On Khalid's advice the Muslim forces retreated to Dara’ah (or Dara) and Dayr Ayyub, covering the gap between the Yarmouk Gorges and the Harra lava plains, and established a line of camps in the eastern part of the plain of Yarmouk. This was a strong defensive position and these maneuvers pitted the Muslims and Byzantines into a decisive battle, one which the latter had tried to avoid. During these maneuvers, there were no engagements save for a minor skirmish between Khalid's elite light cavalry and the Byzantine advance guard.


Tension game played by Khalid bin Walid

Khalid's strategy of withdrawing from the occupied areas and concentrating all of his troops for a decisive battle forced the Byzantines to concentrate their five armies in response. The Byzantines had for centuries avoided engaging in large-scale decisive battles, and the concentration of their forces created logistical strains for which the empire was ill-prepared. Damascus was the closest logistical base, but Mansur, leader of Damascus, could not fully supply the massive Byzantine army that was gathered at the Yarmouk plain. Several clashes were reported with local citizens over supply requisition, as summer was at an end and there was a decline of pasturage. Greek court sources accused Vahan of treason for his disobedience to Heraclius' command not to engage in large-scale battle with Arabs. Given the massing of the Muslim armies at Yarmouk, however, Vahan had little choice but to respond in kind. Relations between the various Byzantine commanders were also fraught with tension. There was a struggle for power between Trithurios and Vahan, Jarajis, and Qanateer (Buccinator). Jabalah, the Christian Arab leader, was largely ignored, to the detriment of the Byzantines given his knowledge of the local terrain. An atmosphere of mistrust thus existed between the Greeks, Armenians, and Arabs. Longstanding ecclesiastical feuds between the Monophysite and Chalcedonian factions, while of negligible direct impact, certainly inflamed underlying tensions. The effect of these feuds was decreased coordination and planning, one of the reasons for the catastrophic Byzantine defeat.


Hazrat Umar (R.A) playing his CArds 

Vahan was instructed by Heraclius not to engage in battle until all avenues of diplomacy had been explored. This was probably because Yazdegerd III's forces were not yet ready for the offensive in Iraq. Accordingly, Vahan sent Gregory and then Jabalah to negotiate, though their efforts proved futile. Before the battle, on Vahan's invitation, Khalid came to negotiate peace, to a similar end. These negotiations delayed the battles for a month. On the other hand, Caliph Umar, whose forces at Qadisiyah were threatened with confronting the Sassanid armies, ordered Sa`d ibn Abi Waqqas to enter into negotiations with the Persians and send emissaries to Yazdegerd III and his commander Rostam Farrokhzād, apparently inviting them to Islam. This was most probably the delaying tactic employed by Umar on the Persian front.[59] Meanwhile he sent reinforcements of 6,000 troops, mostly from Yemen, to Khalid. This force included 1,000 Sahaba (companions of Muhammad), among whom were 100 veterans of the Battle of Badr, the first battle in Islamic history, and included citizens of the highest rank, such asZubayr ibn al-Awwam, Abu Sufyan, and his wife Hind bint Utbah.
Umar, apparently wanting to defeat the Byzantines first, employed the best Muslim troops against them. The continuing stream of Muslim reinforcements worried the Byzantines, who fearing that the Muslims with such reinforcements would grow powerful, decided that they had no choice but to attack. The reinforcements that were sent to the Muslims at Yarmouk arrived in small bands, giving the impression of a continuous stream of reinforcements, in order to demoralize the Byzantines and compel them to attack. The same tactic would be repeated again during the Battle of Qadisiyah.

The Battle that made khalid bin Walid a great General  


The Battle of Yarmuk took place from the 15th-20th of August, 636 A.D. After years of raids, skirmishes, counterattacks, and negotiations the assembled armies of the East Roman Empire and the Islamic Caliphate met on the field of battle.

The Roman army was arranged with the Wadi Allan gorge to their right, the Wadi Ruqqad to their left. The East Roman right consisted mainly of infantry and formed a base for the center and left. The center, composed mostly of Armenians, was commanded by Vahan, while allied Arabs took position on the far left. The Muslim infantry covered the front, with cavalry behind the center and flanks, an additional cavalry unit in the rear. The East Romans had established a base camp at Yaqusah, northwest of Yarmuk, the Muslims camped immediately behind the battle lines. 




The first day of this six day battle begin with dueling by champions of each side, a common event in battles of the time, with Muslim sources recording a string of victories. Vahan probed the Islamic lines with his infantry, the Muslim lines held, and both sides took the measure of the other. 

On the second day dueling champions and probing attacks were forgotten as Vahan launched an attack across the Muslim front. Combined Roman cataphract and skutatoi formations, heavily outnumbering the Muslims, struck hard at the Muslim center, pining it in place while the Muslim flanks were charged. Roman cavalry and infantry broke the Muslim right flank, forcing Muslim infantry and cavalry back to their camps. Here the Muslim wives forced their men to hold their ground, using every tactic from singing songs to throwing rocks at them. The Muslim right held, and with cavalry reserves were able to drive the Romans back. The Roman skutatoi drove into the Muslim left flank and were similarly repelled, the Muslim wives forcing their men into combat. As the second day of battle closed neither side held any clear advantage, though both had suffered casualties. 

Vahan focused his attention on the Muslim right flank on the third day of battle. Roman cataphracts, skutatoi, psiloi, and Arab allies charged into the Muslim right flank, which once again held, thanks to the efforts of the Muslim reserve cavalry and the wives. 

The fourth day of combat again saw Vahan committed to breaking the Islamic right flank. Cataphracts and Arab faris allies charged the Muslim right. In response Khalid ordered a counterattack of the Roman center and right, leaving the Roman left flank dangerously exposed. The Muslims countered the Roman left flank, successfully forcing the Arab allied cavalry away from their supporting infantry. Cut off from the rest of the army the Arab allies fled, pursued by the Muslims to the Wadi Ruqquad, site of the bridge that lead to the main Roman camp at Yaqusah. The Roman left flank had lost its Arab contingent, and had failed to protect its main avenue of retreat to the Roman base camp. 

The only saving grace for the Romans on the fourth day was on the Muslim left flank, where Roman psiloi and cataphract archers inflicted the Day of Lost Eyes on the Muslims. With the Muslim cavalry crushing the Roman left flank, the Muslim infantry of the left flank suffered heavy casualties holding the line against the Roman attack. The Muslims were able to hold, though this time several of the wives themselves fell to Roman blades. 

The fifth day saw fruitless negotiations being carried out by both sides. With neither Roman nor Muslim willing to negotiate both sides used the fifth day to rest and regroup. 

Khalid knew on the sixth day that victory was within his grasp. He sent his forces into a full attack on the Roman lines, concentrating on the weakened Roman left flank. The Roman left, cut off from its base camp and having suffered heavy losses on the fourth day, collapsed entirely. Following the collapse of the Roman left the center and right broke formation. Roman troops fled for their lives, the bloodied Muslims taking no prisoners and slaughtering any stragglers. Vahan himself was most likely killed in the disorganized retreat. Thousands of Romans, in small groups or individually, were able to escape the battlefield, fleeing south to Egypt or north to Emesa. 

AFTERMATH:

Immediately after this operation was over, Khalid and his mobile guard moved north to pursue the retreating Byzantine soldiers; he found them near Damascus and attacked. In the ensuing fight the commander-in-chief of the imperial army, the Armenian prince Vahan, who had escaped the fate of most of his men at Yarmouk, was killed. Khalid then entered Damascus where he was said to have been welcomed by the local residents, thus recapturing the city.


When news of the disaster reached the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius at Antioch, he was devastated and enraged. He blamed his wrongdoings for the loss, primarily referring to his incestuous marriage to his niece Martina. He would have tried to reconquer the province if he had had the resources, but now he had neither the men nor the money to defend the province any more. Instead he retreated to the cathedral of Antioch, where he observed a solemn service of intercession He summoned a meeting of his advisers at the cathedral and scrutinized the situation. He was told almost unanimously, and accepted the fact, that the defeat was God's decision and a result of the sins of the people of the land, including him.Heraclius took to the sea on a ship to Constantinople in the night. It is said that as his ship set sail, he bade a last farewell to Syria, saying:
Farewell, a long farewell to Syria, my fair province. Thou art an infidel's (enemy's) now. Peace be with you, O Syria – what a beautiful land you will be for the enemy.
Heraclius abandoned Syria with the holy relic of the True Cross which was, along with other relics held at Jerusalem, secretly boarded on ship by Parthia of Jerusalem, just to protect it from the invading Arabs. It is said that the emperor had a fear of water. and a pontoon bridge was made for Heraclius to cross the Bosphorus to Constantinople. After abandoning Syria, the Emperor began to concentrate on his remaining forces for the defence of Anatolia and Egypt instead. Byzantine Armenia fell to the Muslims in 638–39, after which Heraclius created a buffer zone in central Anatolia by ordering all the forts east of Tarsus to be evacuated. In 639–642 Muslims invaded and captured Byzantine Egypt, led by Amr ibn al-A'as – who had commanded the right flank of the Rashidun army at Yarmouk.



CONCLUSIVE EVALUATION:

The Battle of Yarmouk can be seen as an example in military history where an inferior force manages to overcome a superior force by superior generalship.
The Imperial Byzantine commanders allowed their enemy to have the battlefield of his choosing. Even then they were at no substantial tactical disadvantage. Khalid knew all along that he was up against a force superior in numbers and, until the last day of the battle, he conducted an essentially defensive campaign suited to his relatively limited resources. When he decided to take the offensive and attack on the final day of battle, he did so with a degree of imagination, foresight and courage that none of the Byzantine commanders managed to display. Although he commanded a numerically inferior force and needed all the men he could muster, he nevertheless had the confidence and foresight to dispatch a cavalry regiment the night before his assault to seal off a critical path of the retreat he anticipated for the enemy army.
Because of his leadership at Yarmouk, Khalid ibn al-Walid is considered one of the finest generals in history and his use of mounted warriors throughout the battle showed just how well he understood the potential strengths and weaknesses of his mounted troops. His mobile guard moved quickly from one point to another, always changing the course of events wherever they appeared, and then just as quickly galloping away to change the course of events elsewhere on the field.
Vahan and his Byzantine commanders did not manage to deal with this mounted force and use the sizable advantage of their army effectively. Their own Byzantine cavalry never played a significant role in the battle and were held in static reserve for most of the six days.They never pushed their attacks and even when they obtained what could have been a decisive breakthrough on the fourth day, they were unable to exploit it. There appeared to be a decided lack of resolve among the Imperial commanders, though this may have been caused by difficulties commanding the army because of internal conflict. Moreover, many of the Arab auxiliaries were mere levies, while the Muslim Arab army consisted for a much larger part of veteran troops.
The original strategy of Heraclius, to destroy the Muslim troops in Syria, needed a rapid and quick deployment, but the commanders on the ground never displayed these qualities. Ironically, on the field at Yarmouk, Khalid carried out on a small tactical scale what Heraclius had planned on a grand strategic scale: by rapidly deploying and manoeuvering his forces, Khalid was able to temporarily concentrate sufficient forces at specific locations on the field to defeat the larger Byzantine army in detail. Vahan was never able to make his numerical superiority count, perhaps because of the unfavorable terrain that prevented large-scale deployment. However, at no point did Vahan attempt to concentrate a superior force to achieve a critical breakthrough. Although he was on the offensive 5 days out of the six, his battle line remained remarkably static. This all stands in stark contrast to the very successful offensive plan that Khalid carried out on the final day, when he reorganised virtually all his cavalry and committed them to a grand manoeuvre that won the battle. George F. Nafziger, in his book Islam at war, describes the battle as:

THE SOURCES OF THE ABOVE MENTIONED MATERIAL: 

  1. http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com
  2. Akram, A.I. The Sword Of Allah: Khalid bin al Waleed, his Life and Campaigns, Karachi, 1970. 
  3. http://althistory.wikia.com/wiki/Battle_of_Yarmuk_(Yarmuk)
  4. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Yarmouk#Muslim_strategy
  5. and various sources compiled by rana muddasar 

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