Explain how Kalabag dam is bone of contention between the provinces? what is the actual reality behind the relics of Kalabag dam. Is Kalabag the panacea to all our Sufferings?
Explain how Kalabag dam is bone of contention between the provinces? what is the actual reality behind the relics of Kalabag dam. Is Kalabag the panacea to all our Sufferings?
THE UNTOLD FACTS — I
Naseer Memon September 4, 2016.
DEBUNKING THE MYTHS ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL KALABAGH DAM.
Recently, a serving chairman of Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda), launched a campaign in favour of the Kalabagh Dam. His article ‘Kalabagh Dam — sifting facts from fiction’ was published in newspapers in many parts. Zafar Mahmood, who has now resigned as chairman Wapda, brought to the fore several facts but left several facts untold. It was unbecoming for the head of Wapda to use his official position to lend favour to a project that has been repudiated by the elected assemblies and people of three provinces. They were forced to think that, perhaps, only an official from Punjab could enjoy this liberty. This episode further tarnished the federal character of Wapda in the smaller provinces. The organisation has compromised its credibility over the years for its unveiled support for the contentious dam. Wapda’s role, at best, was to present an objective and technical
assessment of the project, and let the competent forums to decide its fate. However, it became a flag bearer of the Kalabagh Dam mission. The series of articles, published under his official title, begins with a string of examples to depict how trans-boundary water conflicts were successfully resolved to benefit the competing parties. He has cited only a few good examples, giving the impression as if the whole world amicably evolved a consensus on controversial projects. There are more examples where the upper riparian has taken benefit of its location and given lopsided solutions against the lower riparian.
In fact, the Indus Water Treaty is itself an example where Pakistan was virtually brought to its knees to enter into an inconvenient compact with the upper riparian country. A more recent example of stirred water is Mekong River where six riparian countries keep jostling for their water share. Mekong River Commission (MRC) had been taking pains to avert a conflict among the member countries, but upper riparian steamrolled the water diversion projects at the expense of lower riparian countries. A recent example is the much-resented Xayaburi hydroelectric dam initiated by the Laos government in 2012. The project has ignited a fierce acrimony on energy and economy among Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. The much embittered Cambodia and Vietnam demanded to stall the construction of the dam and commission trans-boundary impact studies. No agreement was reached, but Laos went ahead with the project by bulldozing a treaty inked in1995 to form the commission. The MRC and the treaty both failed to stop Laos from constructing the dam to honour the agreement. Similarly, a series of seven dams constructed by China has fettered flows of the Mekong River afflicting lower Mekong basin territories multifariously. Many such examples can be quoted where upper riparian conveniently scrapped bilateral or multilateral agreements to quench its thirst for water. In the absence of a trustworthy legislative and institutional framework, the lower riparian will justifiably cringe from such projects that can potentially make it subservient to the upstream control of the spigot. Wapda has trivialized (underestimate) the sanctity and credibility of the data by reporting contradictory data in various reports. Data on water availability is often tweaked to fudge the results in favour of Punjab. In a country where the most revered guarantee, the Constitution itself, has remained ineffective for several years and most of the national institutions brazenly (openly) continue to act as an extension of a dominant province, the politically debilitated lower riparian would not easily accept such a decision. The author Mahmood has expressed his empathy with the team of experts that signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 and squarely hold the then army chief Gen. Ayub responsible for the pact. He did not, however, explain as to why all the experts were selected from only one province? The team was assigned a sacred duty of protecting the ‘national interest’, but they could not muster the courage to defy a dictator. Additionally, the eastern rivers surrendered to India would also contribute an annual flow of 11 to 13 million acre feet (MAF) to Sindh. Why a key stakeholder province was not involved in the critical negotiations? Similarly, he also failed to explain why all the replacement projects were constructed in Punjab, and Sindh was denied its legitimate share of compensation in any form. A multi-million dollar project like a dam requires a credible set of data to analyse and discuss arguments in case of opposite views. Wapda, being the premier water management organization, was supposed to become a reliable repository of data on water resources. Regrettably, Wapda has trivialized the sanctity and credibility of the data by reporting contradictory data in various reports. Data on water availability is often tweaked to fudge the results in favour of Punjab. In 2003, the government of Pakistan spent approximately Rs300 million to install telemetry system at 23 sites in the Indus basin to record real time flow data at dams, barrages and canals. The system was installed to ensure transparency of data by monitoring inflows and outflows at all dams and barrages through an automatic electronic system. However, the system soon became dysfunctional only to stoke further mistrust in the lower riparian province. Currently, it is an orphan child not owned by any one. The government continues to incur an annual loss of Rs22 million to Rs44 million to pay salaries of the staff deployed to maintain the jealously guarded relic of Wapda.
Dams are not constructed to be left empty. Similarly, only permanent surplus flows are stored in any reservoir of any kind. Water accounting of Indus flows has to empirically determine if there is any surplus available for storage in a normal year or the misleading rhetoric of surplus flow is based on the flow data of occasional wet years to artificially augment the averages.
The premise for new reservoirs is often based on a distorted claim that more than 30MAF water is being wastefully drained to the sea and the same should be stored. Availability of this surplus flows is actually an eyewash that has been propagated by the pro-dam lobby. In fact this so-called surplus has already been committed for various uses. There are certain canals under construction for which allocations have already been earmarked.
Total allocations for Kacchi canal, Reni canal, Pat Feeder extension, Gomal Zam dam, additional storage of Mangla Dam and leaching requirement under LBOD project are 8.9MAF. Agreed upon Indian uses on Western rivers under Indus Water Treaty are 2MAF and eastern rivers’ inflows that India can eventually divert are 6.23MAF. From 1976-77 to 2003-04, average uses in Kharif remained at 11.24 MAF, less than the allocation under the water accord of 1991. This quantity of water should also be deducted from the surplus flows. All these deductions will leave hardly any surplus water available. Especially during the lean flow years, there will be no water available for storage. All this data is part of Wapda’s own documents and can’t be denied flatly. This simple arithmetic is conveniently skirted while recommending new storage reservoirs. Even if 30MAF of water is construed to be surplus, engineering principles nullify making it the basis for any new storage. In the episode 18, the author has provided 30 years flow data below Kotri barrage that calculates an average surplus of 29.48 years. However, the surplus depicts average annual flow that is not commensurate with the quantity of flows in most of the years. Out of 30 reported years, flow crossed the averages only in 17 years. During 15 years from 2000-01 to 2014-15, flows at Kotri surpassed this average in only 2 years and reached 10MAF in only 8 years. Average surplus of last 15 years becomes only 15.5MAF. However, if flows of the two high flood years 2010-11 and 2014-15 are deducted, the average plummets to only 10.9 MAF which is just enough to meet the commitment of the water accord 1991. This data has been provided by no one else but the author Zafar Mahmood himself, which is a glaring evidence of a grossly misinterpreted availability of surplus flows. If a new storage is constructed, the whole irrigation network will be sprawled (spread) and additional uses of water will also be established. From where would Wapda arrange water during the low flow years?
THE UNTOLD FACTS — II Naseer Memon September 11, 2016
Kalabagh Dam has been scorned by three provinces and pressing for the project further may jeopardise national unity and inter-provincial harmony. Standards of engineering and hydrology require reliability of surplus flows for around ten months in a year to justify a new reservoir. Applying simple arithmetic on the author Zafar Mahmood’s own data negates the claim of surplus water and thus water for new storages is simply not available.
No irrigation and dam expert on earth would countenance (support) occasional excessive flows as the basis for a large on-stream dam. In cases of extremely high flows like the 2010 floods, no dam would have been able to absorb a deluge of this magnitude. This has also been acknowledged by the author Mahmood.
Another important fact that has been ignored by him is the likely reduction of the inflow of Kabul River in the coming years. About 17 MAF water annually enters Pakistan through the Kabul River. It is estimated that the country may suffer approx 15-17 per cent drop in water supply from Afghanistan after construction of 13 dams on the Kabul River in Afghanistan. The flow data monitored at Attock shows that Kabul River’s flow has sharply declined from 28 MAF in 1937-38 to 19 MAF in 2006-07. Future diversion in Afghanistan may eventually reduce the surplus for storage to a net deficit. In brief, the surplus water is not available in most of the recorded years and the available data does not corroborate the myth of wastage below Kotri. The future outlook is even grimmer in the wake of rapidly-changing climatic pattern and acrimonious relations with Afghanistan. Wapda’s vagaries on the proposed two off-taking canals from the dam body is another thorny issue. Initial design of the dam clearly provided two canals on both sides of the dam. Although the World Bank experts did not endorse the proposition of stub tunnels on economic grounds, Wapda had desired for these canals to be part of the project. Another former chairman of Wapda, Shams-ul-Mulk, is a staunch supporter of these canals and has been publicly advocating for these canals to irrigate the southern parts of KP. Hence, the original design was not merely meant to store 6 MAF in the lake but also required almost the same amount of additional flows through each of the aforementioned two canals. Zafar Mahmood mentions that the revised design presented to the CDWP/ECNEC in 1989 does not include these canals. However, the revised design has not yet been formally approved by the competent forums and the pro-dam lobbies in Wapda have not yet abandoned their plans for these canals. The author has also avoided discussing as to why Bhasha Dam has been put on the back-burner (left) for several years. The feasibility of Bhasha Dam has already been completed and it was expected to be completed within seven years. As per schedule, this dam should have been commissioned by now. An inexplicably slouchy execution of the Bhasha Dam project seems a deliberate attempt to keep the Kalabagh Dam project alive.
No one can imagine the miseries of people living on both sides of Indus spread over 100 kilometres between Kotri barrage and sea during lean years. If 35 MAF water is being wasted to the sea, why is the Indus delta experiencing an unrelenting ecological havoc? Zafar Mahmood has discussed the impact of Kalabagh dam on the riverine area (kachho/sailaba) and the Indus delta in the episode 16 and 17 respectively. The author has indicated that KBD consultants had conducted a study on the need of irrigating the Kachho area. However, Sindh objected to the findings and demanded a fresh study which could not be conducted yet. In the 1980s, Wapda commissioned a consortium of six consulting firms called Kalabagh Consultants (KBC) to study various aspects of the Kalabagh Dam. The consortium produced a very detailed report in 1983. The report “Kalabagh Dam Project Planning Report” spread over 13 volumes and scores of memorandums encompassed several aspects of the dam, but surprisingly the report did not include any volume on impacts of the dam on lower riparian areas such as the impact on Kachho area and the Indus delta. Who developed the terms of reference (ToRs) of the study and why such important dimensions were not included in the ToRs is an enigma.
Between Kashmore and Indus, the Kaccho area of Sindh is spread over more than two million acres. It is roughly divided into the present and the abandoned river channels (600,000 acres), forest lands (450,000 acres), roads, settlements and government structures (50,000 acres) and agriculture land (one million acres). Reliable estimates of the population in Kachho are not available, however a conservative count puts it close to one million. Traditionally people in Kachho/sailaba area would abandon their abodes during the monsoon season and return after recession of flood. Leaving tons of nutrient rich silt and recharged aquifer, the floods used to be a boon for kachho community. People would just strew seed to have bumper harvests in the post-flood season. Sailaba area had been a breadbasket of Sindh. Seasonal inundation of kachho would herald rich seasonal harvest. Profusion of cereals, pulses and dairy and forest products would guarantee prosperous livelihood for the kachho community.
However, rampant damming and diversions of Indus during the recent decades have changed the flood regime entirely. Before Tarbela Dam, the Kachho area of Sindh received a flood of 300,000 cusecs almost every year and a flood of 500,000 cusecs for 77 per cent (three out of four) years. Tarbela Dam and other barrages have completely altered the flood pattern. Construction of any other dam will further curtail flows to the Kachho area. The situation is likely to aggravate during low flow years, potentially depriving hundreds of thousands of people of their livelihood in the Kachho area of Sindh. The flow data monitored at Attock shows that Kabul River’s flow has sharply declined.
Indus delta has become a case study for international research bodies to learn how upstream development unleashes ecological disaster in the downstream. The notion of 35 MAF wastage to sea, a handiwork of Wapda, has already been discussed at length. A misperception has been manufactured that 35 MAF water is flowing into the sea whereas Sindh needs only 8 MAF for its ecological balance in delta. What is dexterously (skilfully) masked under averages is the fact that between 1999-2000 and 2010-11 there were five years when flows below Kotri were not even 5 MAF. In year 2000-2001 and 2004-05, not even one MAF water crossed the gates of Kotri barrage. No one can imagine the miseries of people living on both sides of Indus spread over 100 kilometres between Kotri barrage and sea during such lean years. If 35 MAF water is really being wasted to the sea, why is the Indus delta experiencing an unrelenting ecological havoc? This simple logic corroborates the claim that Indus delta needs much more than the current flows for its ecological sustenance. More than two million acres of land in coastal districts of Sindh have been devoured by the sea. A few months ago, experts informed a Senate Standing Committee on Science and Technology that if urgent remedies were not employed, Thatta and Badin will be submerged by 2050 and Karachi by 2060. This ominous warning came from the experts of National Institute of Oceanography (NIO). The experts mentioned that for 300 days in a year, water did not flow to sea, which is a major causative factor behind incessant sea intrusion. This environmental catastrophe is completely obscured by illusory averages of excess flow to sea.
The Kalabagh Dam consultants’ marvel of 13 volumes did not find it worth studying as one of the most obvious impact of any large dam. Those busy in mourning the 35 MAF wastage to sea have never bothered to visit the delta. Millions of impoverished people are paying the price on a daily basis to sustain the prosperity enjoyed upstream.
While water bureaucracy takes pride in boasting dams and barrages for a massive increase in per acre yield, it easily turns blind eyes to the agonies endured by the delta dwellers. Coastal forest, fish stock, sources of livelihood and the whole ecosystem has been devastated in the coastal areas of Sindh.
Although Sindh had been clamouring on this injustice for decades, Wapda could not install any credible monitoring mechanism to observe the trend of sea intrusion. Simple data on a creeping boundary of tidal accretion, quality of subsoil water and salt content in the soil could easily establish scientific evidence if Wapda could not afford the commonly-available advanced technology. Premier environmental research and advocacy bodies like International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) have conducted various research studies to prove that upstream diversion has caused irreversibly detrimental effects on the delta.
Kalabagh Dam has been scorned by three provinces and pressing for the project further would jeopardise a much-eroded national unity and inter-provincial harmony. Concluded
________________________________________
Mekong River Longest river of Southeast Asia.
Rising in eastern Tibet, China, it flows south across the highlands of Yunnan province. It then forms part of the border between Myanmar (Burma) and Laos, as well as between Laos and Thailand. It runs through Laos and Cambodia before entering the China Sea in a delta south of Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam after a course of 2,700 mi (4,350 km). Vientiane and Phnom Penh stand on its banks. Its lower course has about one-third of the combined population of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 1957 the UN initiated the Mekong River Development Project, an international effort to harness the river for hydroelectricity and irrigation.
Sources:
THE UNTOLD FACTS — I
Naseer Memon September 4, 2016.
DEBUNKING THE MYTHS ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL KALABAGH DAM.
Recently, a serving chairman of Water and Power Development Authority (Wapda), launched a campaign in favour of the Kalabagh Dam. His article ‘Kalabagh Dam — sifting facts from fiction’ was published in newspapers in many parts. Zafar Mahmood, who has now resigned as chairman Wapda, brought to the fore several facts but left several facts untold. It was unbecoming for the head of Wapda to use his official position to lend favour to a project that has been repudiated by the elected assemblies and people of three provinces. They were forced to think that, perhaps, only an official from Punjab could enjoy this liberty. This episode further tarnished the federal character of Wapda in the smaller provinces. The organisation has compromised its credibility over the years for its unveiled support for the contentious dam. Wapda’s role, at best, was to present an objective and technical
assessment of the project, and let the competent forums to decide its fate. However, it became a flag bearer of the Kalabagh Dam mission. The series of articles, published under his official title, begins with a string of examples to depict how trans-boundary water conflicts were successfully resolved to benefit the competing parties. He has cited only a few good examples, giving the impression as if the whole world amicably evolved a consensus on controversial projects. There are more examples where the upper riparian has taken benefit of its location and given lopsided solutions against the lower riparian.
In fact, the Indus Water Treaty is itself an example where Pakistan was virtually brought to its knees to enter into an inconvenient compact with the upper riparian country. A more recent example of stirred water is Mekong River where six riparian countries keep jostling for their water share. Mekong River Commission (MRC) had been taking pains to avert a conflict among the member countries, but upper riparian steamrolled the water diversion projects at the expense of lower riparian countries. A recent example is the much-resented Xayaburi hydroelectric dam initiated by the Laos government in 2012. The project has ignited a fierce acrimony on energy and economy among Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. The much embittered Cambodia and Vietnam demanded to stall the construction of the dam and commission trans-boundary impact studies. No agreement was reached, but Laos went ahead with the project by bulldozing a treaty inked in1995 to form the commission. The MRC and the treaty both failed to stop Laos from constructing the dam to honour the agreement. Similarly, a series of seven dams constructed by China has fettered flows of the Mekong River afflicting lower Mekong basin territories multifariously. Many such examples can be quoted where upper riparian conveniently scrapped bilateral or multilateral agreements to quench its thirst for water. In the absence of a trustworthy legislative and institutional framework, the lower riparian will justifiably cringe from such projects that can potentially make it subservient to the upstream control of the spigot. Wapda has trivialized (underestimate) the sanctity and credibility of the data by reporting contradictory data in various reports. Data on water availability is often tweaked to fudge the results in favour of Punjab. In a country where the most revered guarantee, the Constitution itself, has remained ineffective for several years and most of the national institutions brazenly (openly) continue to act as an extension of a dominant province, the politically debilitated lower riparian would not easily accept such a decision. The author Mahmood has expressed his empathy with the team of experts that signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960 and squarely hold the then army chief Gen. Ayub responsible for the pact. He did not, however, explain as to why all the experts were selected from only one province? The team was assigned a sacred duty of protecting the ‘national interest’, but they could not muster the courage to defy a dictator. Additionally, the eastern rivers surrendered to India would also contribute an annual flow of 11 to 13 million acre feet (MAF) to Sindh. Why a key stakeholder province was not involved in the critical negotiations? Similarly, he also failed to explain why all the replacement projects were constructed in Punjab, and Sindh was denied its legitimate share of compensation in any form. A multi-million dollar project like a dam requires a credible set of data to analyse and discuss arguments in case of opposite views. Wapda, being the premier water management organization, was supposed to become a reliable repository of data on water resources. Regrettably, Wapda has trivialized the sanctity and credibility of the data by reporting contradictory data in various reports. Data on water availability is often tweaked to fudge the results in favour of Punjab. In 2003, the government of Pakistan spent approximately Rs300 million to install telemetry system at 23 sites in the Indus basin to record real time flow data at dams, barrages and canals. The system was installed to ensure transparency of data by monitoring inflows and outflows at all dams and barrages through an automatic electronic system. However, the system soon became dysfunctional only to stoke further mistrust in the lower riparian province. Currently, it is an orphan child not owned by any one. The government continues to incur an annual loss of Rs22 million to Rs44 million to pay salaries of the staff deployed to maintain the jealously guarded relic of Wapda.
Dams are not constructed to be left empty. Similarly, only permanent surplus flows are stored in any reservoir of any kind. Water accounting of Indus flows has to empirically determine if there is any surplus available for storage in a normal year or the misleading rhetoric of surplus flow is based on the flow data of occasional wet years to artificially augment the averages.
The premise for new reservoirs is often based on a distorted claim that more than 30MAF water is being wastefully drained to the sea and the same should be stored. Availability of this surplus flows is actually an eyewash that has been propagated by the pro-dam lobby. In fact this so-called surplus has already been committed for various uses. There are certain canals under construction for which allocations have already been earmarked.
Total allocations for Kacchi canal, Reni canal, Pat Feeder extension, Gomal Zam dam, additional storage of Mangla Dam and leaching requirement under LBOD project are 8.9MAF. Agreed upon Indian uses on Western rivers under Indus Water Treaty are 2MAF and eastern rivers’ inflows that India can eventually divert are 6.23MAF. From 1976-77 to 2003-04, average uses in Kharif remained at 11.24 MAF, less than the allocation under the water accord of 1991. This quantity of water should also be deducted from the surplus flows. All these deductions will leave hardly any surplus water available. Especially during the lean flow years, there will be no water available for storage. All this data is part of Wapda’s own documents and can’t be denied flatly. This simple arithmetic is conveniently skirted while recommending new storage reservoirs. Even if 30MAF of water is construed to be surplus, engineering principles nullify making it the basis for any new storage. In the episode 18, the author has provided 30 years flow data below Kotri barrage that calculates an average surplus of 29.48 years. However, the surplus depicts average annual flow that is not commensurate with the quantity of flows in most of the years. Out of 30 reported years, flow crossed the averages only in 17 years. During 15 years from 2000-01 to 2014-15, flows at Kotri surpassed this average in only 2 years and reached 10MAF in only 8 years. Average surplus of last 15 years becomes only 15.5MAF. However, if flows of the two high flood years 2010-11 and 2014-15 are deducted, the average plummets to only 10.9 MAF which is just enough to meet the commitment of the water accord 1991. This data has been provided by no one else but the author Zafar Mahmood himself, which is a glaring evidence of a grossly misinterpreted availability of surplus flows. If a new storage is constructed, the whole irrigation network will be sprawled (spread) and additional uses of water will also be established. From where would Wapda arrange water during the low flow years?
THE UNTOLD FACTS — II Naseer Memon September 11, 2016
Kalabagh Dam has been scorned by three provinces and pressing for the project further may jeopardise national unity and inter-provincial harmony. Standards of engineering and hydrology require reliability of surplus flows for around ten months in a year to justify a new reservoir. Applying simple arithmetic on the author Zafar Mahmood’s own data negates the claim of surplus water and thus water for new storages is simply not available.
No irrigation and dam expert on earth would countenance (support) occasional excessive flows as the basis for a large on-stream dam. In cases of extremely high flows like the 2010 floods, no dam would have been able to absorb a deluge of this magnitude. This has also been acknowledged by the author Mahmood.
Another important fact that has been ignored by him is the likely reduction of the inflow of Kabul River in the coming years. About 17 MAF water annually enters Pakistan through the Kabul River. It is estimated that the country may suffer approx 15-17 per cent drop in water supply from Afghanistan after construction of 13 dams on the Kabul River in Afghanistan. The flow data monitored at Attock shows that Kabul River’s flow has sharply declined from 28 MAF in 1937-38 to 19 MAF in 2006-07. Future diversion in Afghanistan may eventually reduce the surplus for storage to a net deficit. In brief, the surplus water is not available in most of the recorded years and the available data does not corroborate the myth of wastage below Kotri. The future outlook is even grimmer in the wake of rapidly-changing climatic pattern and acrimonious relations with Afghanistan. Wapda’s vagaries on the proposed two off-taking canals from the dam body is another thorny issue. Initial design of the dam clearly provided two canals on both sides of the dam. Although the World Bank experts did not endorse the proposition of stub tunnels on economic grounds, Wapda had desired for these canals to be part of the project. Another former chairman of Wapda, Shams-ul-Mulk, is a staunch supporter of these canals and has been publicly advocating for these canals to irrigate the southern parts of KP. Hence, the original design was not merely meant to store 6 MAF in the lake but also required almost the same amount of additional flows through each of the aforementioned two canals. Zafar Mahmood mentions that the revised design presented to the CDWP/ECNEC in 1989 does not include these canals. However, the revised design has not yet been formally approved by the competent forums and the pro-dam lobbies in Wapda have not yet abandoned their plans for these canals. The author has also avoided discussing as to why Bhasha Dam has been put on the back-burner (left) for several years. The feasibility of Bhasha Dam has already been completed and it was expected to be completed within seven years. As per schedule, this dam should have been commissioned by now. An inexplicably slouchy execution of the Bhasha Dam project seems a deliberate attempt to keep the Kalabagh Dam project alive.
No one can imagine the miseries of people living on both sides of Indus spread over 100 kilometres between Kotri barrage and sea during lean years. If 35 MAF water is being wasted to the sea, why is the Indus delta experiencing an unrelenting ecological havoc? Zafar Mahmood has discussed the impact of Kalabagh dam on the riverine area (kachho/sailaba) and the Indus delta in the episode 16 and 17 respectively. The author has indicated that KBD consultants had conducted a study on the need of irrigating the Kachho area. However, Sindh objected to the findings and demanded a fresh study which could not be conducted yet. In the 1980s, Wapda commissioned a consortium of six consulting firms called Kalabagh Consultants (KBC) to study various aspects of the Kalabagh Dam. The consortium produced a very detailed report in 1983. The report “Kalabagh Dam Project Planning Report” spread over 13 volumes and scores of memorandums encompassed several aspects of the dam, but surprisingly the report did not include any volume on impacts of the dam on lower riparian areas such as the impact on Kachho area and the Indus delta. Who developed the terms of reference (ToRs) of the study and why such important dimensions were not included in the ToRs is an enigma.
Between Kashmore and Indus, the Kaccho area of Sindh is spread over more than two million acres. It is roughly divided into the present and the abandoned river channels (600,000 acres), forest lands (450,000 acres), roads, settlements and government structures (50,000 acres) and agriculture land (one million acres). Reliable estimates of the population in Kachho are not available, however a conservative count puts it close to one million. Traditionally people in Kachho/sailaba area would abandon their abodes during the monsoon season and return after recession of flood. Leaving tons of nutrient rich silt and recharged aquifer, the floods used to be a boon for kachho community. People would just strew seed to have bumper harvests in the post-flood season. Sailaba area had been a breadbasket of Sindh. Seasonal inundation of kachho would herald rich seasonal harvest. Profusion of cereals, pulses and dairy and forest products would guarantee prosperous livelihood for the kachho community.
However, rampant damming and diversions of Indus during the recent decades have changed the flood regime entirely. Before Tarbela Dam, the Kachho area of Sindh received a flood of 300,000 cusecs almost every year and a flood of 500,000 cusecs for 77 per cent (three out of four) years. Tarbela Dam and other barrages have completely altered the flood pattern. Construction of any other dam will further curtail flows to the Kachho area. The situation is likely to aggravate during low flow years, potentially depriving hundreds of thousands of people of their livelihood in the Kachho area of Sindh. The flow data monitored at Attock shows that Kabul River’s flow has sharply declined.
Indus delta has become a case study for international research bodies to learn how upstream development unleashes ecological disaster in the downstream. The notion of 35 MAF wastage to sea, a handiwork of Wapda, has already been discussed at length. A misperception has been manufactured that 35 MAF water is flowing into the sea whereas Sindh needs only 8 MAF for its ecological balance in delta. What is dexterously (skilfully) masked under averages is the fact that between 1999-2000 and 2010-11 there were five years when flows below Kotri were not even 5 MAF. In year 2000-2001 and 2004-05, not even one MAF water crossed the gates of Kotri barrage. No one can imagine the miseries of people living on both sides of Indus spread over 100 kilometres between Kotri barrage and sea during such lean years. If 35 MAF water is really being wasted to the sea, why is the Indus delta experiencing an unrelenting ecological havoc? This simple logic corroborates the claim that Indus delta needs much more than the current flows for its ecological sustenance. More than two million acres of land in coastal districts of Sindh have been devoured by the sea. A few months ago, experts informed a Senate Standing Committee on Science and Technology that if urgent remedies were not employed, Thatta and Badin will be submerged by 2050 and Karachi by 2060. This ominous warning came from the experts of National Institute of Oceanography (NIO). The experts mentioned that for 300 days in a year, water did not flow to sea, which is a major causative factor behind incessant sea intrusion. This environmental catastrophe is completely obscured by illusory averages of excess flow to sea.
The Kalabagh Dam consultants’ marvel of 13 volumes did not find it worth studying as one of the most obvious impact of any large dam. Those busy in mourning the 35 MAF wastage to sea have never bothered to visit the delta. Millions of impoverished people are paying the price on a daily basis to sustain the prosperity enjoyed upstream.
While water bureaucracy takes pride in boasting dams and barrages for a massive increase in per acre yield, it easily turns blind eyes to the agonies endured by the delta dwellers. Coastal forest, fish stock, sources of livelihood and the whole ecosystem has been devastated in the coastal areas of Sindh.
Although Sindh had been clamouring on this injustice for decades, Wapda could not install any credible monitoring mechanism to observe the trend of sea intrusion. Simple data on a creeping boundary of tidal accretion, quality of subsoil water and salt content in the soil could easily establish scientific evidence if Wapda could not afford the commonly-available advanced technology. Premier environmental research and advocacy bodies like International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) have conducted various research studies to prove that upstream diversion has caused irreversibly detrimental effects on the delta.
Kalabagh Dam has been scorned by three provinces and pressing for the project further would jeopardise a much-eroded national unity and inter-provincial harmony. Concluded
________________________________________
Mekong River Longest river of Southeast Asia.
Rising in eastern Tibet, China, it flows south across the highlands of Yunnan province. It then forms part of the border between Myanmar (Burma) and Laos, as well as between Laos and Thailand. It runs through Laos and Cambodia before entering the China Sea in a delta south of Ho Chi Minh City in Vietnam after a course of 2,700 mi (4,350 km). Vientiane and Phnom Penh stand on its banks. Its lower course has about one-third of the combined population of Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. In 1957 the UN initiated the Mekong River Development Project, an international effort to harness the river for hydroelectricity and irrigation.
Sources:
- Special thanks to Sir Nofil for Compiling and Sharing this worthy information on facebook for students to study. it is among the most frequent question asked in CSS.
- TheNews.com and the writer Naseer Memon, who worked out to explain this topic with so lucid and compelling way.
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